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Dominant Ethnicity and Integration: The Estonian Case 
 
A well known theorist of nationalism, Rogers Brubaker, argues in his article “The 
Return of Assimilation”, that integration and assimilation have both returned as 
important concepts in academic and centre-Left discourse since the 1990s, displacing 
some of the previous emphasis on multiculturalism and difference. (Brubaker 2001) 
Multiculturalism’s emphasis on difference and its preservation is increasingly 
questioned in academic circles in Europe and the United States. More stress has been 
placed on integration and less on preserving difference. Why is this the case?  
 
One reason is connected to my topic theme of dominant group ethnicity. Most western 
societies have an ethnic majority, a dominant ethnic group which sees the state as an 
extension of itself. The dominant group (i.e. the English in Britain, French in France) 
wants to see itself reflected in the state. Yet multiculturalism often portrays 'diversity' 
as everything that is different from the 'bad' old majority group. In North America, 
this means that any ethnic groups which are not white, Anglo-Saxon or Protestant can 
lay claim to being part of a spicy new 'diversity' that is unfolding to replace the bland 
old monoculturalism. The new groups should be celebrated, and the old group derided 
as boring and oppressive. This arose, somewhat understandably, from a left-wing 
determination to supersede shameful episodes in the national past in which dominant 
groups stole land from aboriginals and excluded or repressed minorities. (Kaufmann 
2004) In addition, a strongly conformist culture like the puritanical Protestant 
America of the 1920s or the Catholic conformity of Ireland in the 1950s have been 
viewed by liberals as limiting the potential for individual self-expression. 
 
Naturally enough, many members of ethnic majorities do not identify with 
multiculturalism because they don’t see themselves represented in it - indeed they 
often see themselves criticised by it. This is one of the forces that led to the increasing 
success of far-Right parties in Western European societies like Norway, Italy, Austria 
and France. The centre-Right sought to win back these voters by appealing not to a 
völkisch ethnic nationalism, but rather to civic nationalism. (Bale 2003) The debate 
over integration was further magnified by 9/11, the Madrid bombings, the 7/7 
bombings in London in 2003, the Van Gogh murder in Amsterdam, the Danish 
cartoons controversy and the rise of the so-called 'war on terror'. 
 
Where does integration lie as a concept? According to Brendan O’Leary and John 
McGarry, integration is a policy for regulating ethnic conflict that stands between 
assimilation on the one hand, which involves immigrants or minorities melting fully 
into the dominant group, and multiculturalism on the other, whereby ethnic groups 
maintain their own distinctiveness. (O'Leary and McGarry 1993) 
 
An extreme form of multiculturalism is found in societies where politics is primarily 
organised on the basis of group rights. A current example is Northern Ireland. If you 
are a politician in the Northern Ireland assembly, you must declare yourself either a 
Unionist, a Nationalist or Other. The composition of the Northern Ireland assembly 
mirrors the composition of the Northern Ireland population. Schooling is entirely 
separate – Protestant schools and Catholic schools. In addition, sports, media and 
associational life is lived apart while residential segregation is the norm. There is 
integration in Northern Ireland at work and in the commercial centres of towns, but 
not beyond that.  
 
Integration then, is something between assimilation and the full-blooded 
multiculturalism that we see, for example, in Northern Ireland. In addition, integration 
is linked to the idea of civic nationalism – immigrants should become like natives, but 
only at the level of economics, politics and mass culture, not at the level of private 
beliefs and behaviour.  
 
I want to go back to a work which is referenced often – Milton Gordon’s book 
Assimilation in American Life (Gordon 1964). Gordon broke up the assimilation 
process into a number of steps which I’ve simplified here into cultural, structural 
(economic and political), marital and identificational assimilation. Assimilation 
typically begins with the cultural level, i.e. immigrants come to the United States and 
learn to speak English. This helps them to succeed in the economy, to participate and 
vote in civic life at the local and federal levels, leading to structural assimilation. That 
is what I think we can call civic integration, the new mantra of most modern western 
governments. But one cannot so easily maintain private  diversity when public unity is 
on the march. 'Unity in diversity' thus contains contradictions which cannot be held 
back any more than Canute could command the tides.  
 
When people are getting along so swimmingly at work and in public, chances are they 
are also going to start interacting in private. When you have good civic integration, 
you also have intermarriage, which starts the process of marital and identificational 
(i.e. ethnic) assimilation. A lot of people are finding that white Americans in 
particular are becoming an intermarried group – some 50 percent of Catholics, 
Protestants and Jews marry out and are creating what Richard Alba coined a new 
'Euro American' group. Asian, African and Hispanic Americans are also melting in at 
the edges of this new group. There are still quite clear Jewish American communities 
and there always will be. Everybody is not melting in, but there is definitely a process 
of voluntary assimilation, which Brubaker remarks upon. (Brubaker 2001) The same 
is true in Canada: like most young Canadians, I am of multiple ethnic origin, and this 
tends to weaken the discrete 'cultures' of multiculturalism, leading to more of a 
melting pot. Thus Canada, despite its multiculturalism policy, is actually an excellent 
example of a successful melting pot, albeit one in which newcomers or their 
descendants voluntarily (rather than coercively) blend into the mainstream English or 
French-speaking national cultures. 
 
The last stage of this process is identification with the host society. I’m not saying that 
this is the way things should unfold, but it is what has tended to occur, at least in 
English-speaking societies. This happens voluntarily, and must be distinguished, as 
Brubaker notes, from coercive assimilation policies such as Franco's ban on the use of 
minority languages like Catalan in Spain, or a policy of forcing ethnic minorities to 
declare themselves a member of majority, i.e. the way Kurds in Syria must declare 
themselves Arab in order to get citizenship rights. Clearly these are negative policies 
to be condemned.  
 
That said, what we find in most western countries are statist policies aimed at cultural 
and structural assimilation, i.e. integration policies. These have taken on an almost 
formulaic quality: citizenship ceremonies, as in the United States, national holidays 
(i.e. Bastille Day in France), 'sacred' constitutions, such as the 1982 Canadian Charter 
of Rights, and statements of national 'values' and common institutions and projects as 
found in Gordon Brown's recent pronouncements on Britishness. If we look at the 
Estonian integration policy document, we find similar phraseology – “the strong 
common core of the Estonian society consists of the following elements: general 
humanistic and democratic values, common information space, the Estonian language, 
importance of being a citizen, common institutions”. From this perspective, the 
Estonian integration document is very similar to what we find in other western 
societies: a list of common denominators that won't ruffle too many feathers. The big 
question is whether this actually makes any difference on the ground when it comes to 
interaction between ethnic groups?  
 
For example, the aforementioned components of Estonian identity are held to furnish 
a “strong common core”, yet this may be viewed quite differently by Estonia's main 
ethnic groups. Estonian-Estonians will see nothing of their long history of resistance 
to the Russian 'Bear' or their linguistic connections to the Finns and Hungarians. 
Ethnic Russians will consider the Estonian 'common core' as an Estonian imposition 
that fails to recognise the country's bicultural character. They would desire instead to 
have some of the rights that the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland or Flemings of 
Belgium have. Separate schools and a guaranteed share of the legislature, civil service 
and police force jobs, not to mention official language status and recognition of 
Estonia as a bicultural society.  
 
At this point, it behooves us to briefly consider terminology. I’m not a huge fan of the 
word nation. I’d rather talk about the state and ethnic groups. The nation is 
sometimes used to mean the former, and sometimes the latter, so let us bypass it here. 
The state tries to promote its own community of solidarity and identity. Civic 
nationalism – I prefer the word the state community - is the result. The state wants to 
create a community based on the land, flag, constitution, welfare state, values, and an 
official language. In many ways this can seem a bit abstract for an ordinary citizen in 
terms of their daily life. It may just be the official culture that surrounds them 'out 
there' but fails to reflect their deeper attachments. The question is: will this construct 
satisfy a true Estonian nationalist on the one hand, and ethnic minorities on the other? 
Most likely it won’t satisfy either, which does not, however, mean it should not be 
promulgated.  
 
The ethnic group is a creature of a different stripe to the state community. We can 
think of the Estonian state as promoting one identity project, and the Estonian ethnic 
group as advancing another. If the two projects overlap - as they did in the interwar 
period - you get ethnic nationalism. Today, however, the state and ethnic projects are 
much further apart. Ethnic groups consider themselves to be of shared genealogical 
descent, with a specific language, ethno-history and sometimes religion. We came 
here, we had great battles, suffered great losses, we resisted, and we got our freedom.  
 
Thus the state identity - shaped by political considerations - and the dominant ethnic 
identity, more driven by spiritual and cultural concerns, diverge. For instance, in 
Quebec, the nationalism of the Parti Québecois (PQ) is about the French language 
and the integration of immigrants into this civic culture. However, in reality, there 
also exists a French-Canadian ethnic group largely descended from 10,000 settlers in 
the early 1600s that has 250 years of what it calls 'la survivance' vis á vis the English. 
That narrative of resistance is distinct to the French-Canadian ethnic community and 
does not transmit as easily as language. The alienation of many ethnic French-
Canadians from the PQ's abstract civic nationalism is one of the factors behind the 
recent rise of the populist ADQ, which has cut deeply into the PQ's vote share. 
Similarly, in Estonia, the Estonian ethnic group maintains a collective memory 
stretching back hundreds of years, and mainly oriented against Russian/Soviet 
aggression. This is very different from the statist idea of being part of Europe, doing 
well economically, and so forth. So the Estonian state community and the Estonian 
dominant ethnic community are not the same.  
 
One of the ways of thinking about Estonians and Russians within Estonia is to use an 
optical metaphor of identity based on the way the human eye operates. Light from 
objects is refracted through our lenses and is filtered through the mental Ideas we 
have learned to recognise. We construct our sense of national (read: state) identities in 
the same manner. Different interpretive lenses will distort the light of reality in 
different ways to produce different national images. Thus ethnic Russians and 
Estonians look at Estonia (land, state, people) differently. The ethnic Russians look at 
Estonia and say, 'we came here and saved Estonia from the Nazis, we have a long 
history going back to the Russian empire', etc. The ethnic Estonians peer through a 
different interpretive lens, seeing a history of resisting the Russians, recently 
culminating in freedom - but a freedom which is precarious and must be zealously 
defended. The Bronze Soldier episode neatly encapsulates the different perspectives 
on what are often the same events - but which are nonetheless interpreted differently 
because of different, distorting, ethnic lenses. (See figure 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Two Lenses of Estonian Identity 
 
 
Dominant ethnic groups see themselves as the indigenous population, and the Russian 
population as interlopers: a fifth column introduced by a hostile foreign power. They 
view the Estonian state as an extension of their ethnic selves. As the integration report 
states: 'Estonians regard Estonia primarily as a society that belongs to the dominant 
group, i.e. Estonians, and assume that non-Estonians should have a lower social 
position in that society' (p. 39). Ethnic Russians see the Estonian state as a state for 
ethnic Estonians and not for them, and wish for it to be more of a neutral, and, 
ultimately, bicultural state. One of the most important factors for dominant groups is 
thus the idea of indigenousness – we were here first, we are the natives.  
 
The Estonian ministry of integration clearly wants to move towards the direction of 
being neutral, civic state. But can it ever be neutral? Will Kymlicka makes a clear 
distinction between immigrant groups and national minorities. National minorities see 
themselves as indigenous, whereas immigrant groups do not. Indigenousness is 
crucial - it is part of the logic of international law and informed decolonisation and 
ideas about indigenous land rights. French colons in Algeria were held to be non-
natives, foreign settlers who should rightly leave. For Kymlicka and other political 
theorists, indigenousness makes a big difference as to whether a group should be 
recognised and given a whole series of rights - including self-determination. The 
Russians are a bit ambiguous in this respect: on the one hand, they are more of an 
immigrant group since their past largely dates from 1940. On the other hand, there 
were Russian communities in Estonia (such as Old Believers) going back hundreds of 
years. So perhaps ethnic Russians are an indigenous minority in which case they can 
make a case for collective rights, biculturalism, etc. This is a difficult question, not 
easily resolved. 
 
So what to do - are there any suggestions? Whatever the status of the ethnic Russians, 
in reading the Estonian draft integration policy, I was struck by the low rate of 
naturalisation among ethnic Russians. Survey evidence showed that those who are 
Estonian citizens have more positive attitudes towards the Estonian language and the 
state. So perhaps the rate of naturalisation should be increased, and the language 
requirement perhaps replaced by a loyalty oath - because it seems that higher rates of 
naturalisation would lead more ethnic Russians to have a stake in the society, and see 
it as their own. If the ethnic Russians had much higher fertility or were still 
immigrating, a more cautious approach could be justified in the name of responding to 
the legitimate demands of the dominant Estonian ethnic group. But Estonians are no 
longer ethnically or culturally threatened, so can ease requirements like the 
Lithuanians have. 
 
I would make the same argument for French in Quebec or Catalan in Catalonia. 
Policies concerning language and street signs should be based on trends in hard 
numbers rather than exaggerated fears. The number of speakers of Estonian in Estonia 
is rising which would suggest that the country could be more relaxed about 
assimilation and afford more rights to the Russian minority on the linguistic front. 
 
The Estonian state is right to promote a relatively abstract and thin concept of national 
identity, but there remains the question of the Estonian Estonians – the dominant 
ethnic group. They need to be recognised in any multiculturalism policy, they have to 
be mentioned explicitly as the root of the state upon which diversity has been grafted. 
The lessons of the West show that multiculturalism cannot simply be about minorities 
and how wonderful they are: the ethnic Estonians have to be mentioned as part of the 
story so they can see themselves reflected in multiculturalism. Otherwise, 
multiculturalism comes to be seen as an imposition of urban cosmopolitans, 
minorities and the EU, a foil for ethnic nationalists. Estonian ethnicity is a valid 
identity and it needs to be recognised, but the state should not be an Estonian state 
promoting the Estonian ethnic group the way Israel is a Jewish state. There has to be a 
bifurcation between state and ethnic group.  
 
Assimilation should be voluntary and not coerced. The Russians and Estonians should 
be competing for members just like religious denominations like Lutherans and 
Catholics compete for communicants. Some ethnic groups are more open, some are 
more closed. In Northern Ireland, intermarriage is a taboo. However in the US or 
Britain, it is common. Elsewhere, I have coined the term liberal ethnic group to 
describe the way ethnic groups should handle their boundaries. I stress that ethnic 
groups can be very exclusive when it comes to guarding their traditions from foreign 
cultural influence, but should be open to new members. (Kaufmann 2000) The 
English as an ethnic group are thus more liberal than the Ulster Protestants are. The 
Estonians should emulate the English rather than the Ulster Protestants – it would 
make a lot of sense for ethnic Estonians to be open to intermarriage and association 
with ethnic Russians and others. At the same time, ethnic Estonians should continue 
to reproduce their collective memory going back hundreds of years. But I think ethnic 
Estonianism should use private associations, churches and families to promote their 
identity rather than the Estonian state. Ethnic Estonians would merely comprise one 
ethnic lobby among others whose interests must be balanced by Estonian state policy. 
 
What does the future hold? If integration proceeds, I envision a Gordon-like scenario 
of assimilation in the private sphere. The future of the Estonian melting pot could 
involve a fusion of ethnic Estonians and Russians into something entirely new. 
However, absent a huge volume of non-European immigration, this outcome is 
unlikely. Instead, the most likely scenario will be a slow assimilation of much of the 
Russian minority through intermarriage, with more ethnic Estonians carrying Russian 
surnames as can be seen in Catalonia or the Basque country. We even find this in 
Northern Ireland - Catholic nationalists like Gerry Adams (English surname) and John 
Hume (Scottish surname) clearly have non-Irish ancestors. That said, the Russian 
minority, unlike the Baltic Germans, will survive into the future as a vibrant, albeit 
smaller, minority. But there are caveats. The quickest route to preventing and 
reversing assimilation is to securitise the Russian minority by threatening to 
coercively assimilate them or withdraw their state benefits. In the absence of 
sustained evidence of Russian demographic growth or declining Estonian language 
proficiency, policy should be readily relaxed. If ethnic Russians feel comfortable in 
Estonia and are welcomed into the dominant culture with open arms, they are much 
more likely to embrace their new home and ultimately - over generations - their new 
identity. 
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